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ETHNOGRAPHY ON THE ROAD:
INFRASTRUCTURAL VISION AND THE UNRULY
PRESENT IN CONTEMPORARY DAKAR
Caroline Melly
In his report on the 1966 UNESCO-supported First World Festival of Negro
Arts, John Povey writes of the spectacular infrastructural and architectural
improvements made by the host city of Dakar in anticipation of this international
gathering of artists, intellectuals and tourists. Describing his arrival by plane in
the ‘fresh, attractive, sophisticated city’ (1966: 4), the author appears as dazzled
by the modern, urban landscape as he is by the artistic presentations and
productions that were the intended focus of the festival. As he journeys along the
seaside Route de la Corniche and into the heart of the city, Povey marvels at
stunning new hotels, museums, theatres and government buildings, all built to
preserve Senegal’s cultural heritage and to promote a vision of the future that was
thoroughly in line with the dominant négritude ideologies of the time. Meanwhile,
Povey notes, the nagging poverty and inequality that characterized this former
colonial capital was carefully contained, deliberately and ‘neatly shrouded from
visitors’ view by stretches of rush matting or corrugated iron’ (ibid.). What Povey
encountered in the mid-1960s was a grand vision proffered by the highly visible
and inﬂuential President Léopold Sédar Senghor of the post-colonial nation as
reborn through its modern and capable capital city. The city he described was
committed to promoting its own brand of intellectual and artistic expression, one
that was both dazzling in its ambitions and limited in its scope, excluding vast
geographical sections and populations even as it claimed a more encompassing
vision of the future.
Arriving as a researcher exactly forty years later, I found myself surrounded by
ostensibly similar efforts to reinvent and reposition Dakar through large-scale
construction projects (grands travaux) promoted and overseen by the Senegalese
state and aimed at building a truly ‘global’ capital city. By the spring of 2006, the
city was steadily being transformed by a host of new spaces and structures that
seemed to echo building projects launched decades ago: by an autoroute that
would link the peninsular capital to the mainland and would someday include a
toll portion; by the controversial Monument de la Renaissance Africaine, built in
close proximity to the airport; by the reinvention of the well-travelled Corniche
into a sleek seaside passageway; and by the construction of ﬁve-star hotels,
restaurants and shopping plazas along this same storied road. Channelling the
aura of Senghor and other post-colonial leaders, President Abdoulaye Wade
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claimed these projects as integral components of his own authoritative vision for
the city and the nation, and as evidence that even his grandest dreams had the
power to become reality (Fofana 2010; see also De Jong and Foucher 2010).1 But
these projects and structures also expressed a break with modernist approaches
to infrastructural development that emphasized planning, calculation and
‘rationality’ (see Scott 1998). Drawing inspiration instead from the seemingly
meteoric rise of global cities like Dubai, the President and his allies sought to lure
international attention and capital and thus to reposition Dakar as both ‘the most
beautiful city in Africa’ and as a global destination for foreign investment and
leisure.2 In contrast to the architectural achievements that captivated Povey in the
1960s, the contemporary spaces and structures that inspired this essay were not
built to house national treasures or to display the talents and arts of a revitalized
African spirit, one that was necessarily collective and ﬁrmly and explicitly
rooted in a grand past. In contrast, Dakar’s twenty-ﬁrst century ‘renaissance’ was
focused on the construction of professedly globalized spaces of consumption and
circulation that had little to say to post-colonial ideologies like négritude and
instead appeared thoroughly detached from histories and shared struggles of the
past decades. Most of these projects were made possible through partnerships that
linked together national leadership, foreign capital and expertise, and loans and
guidance from international organizations. Targeting a new generation of foreign
travellers called ‘foreign direct investors’, leaders hoped that a cosmopolitan elite
might be lured to this African city – in some ways despite rather than because of
its African-ness – because it could offer the sort of generic comforts that they
would expect to ﬁnd at ‘home’. The President’s vision was thus ﬁxed squarely on
reinventing Dakar as a new kind of African capital city, one that was attractive to
residents and foreigners alike because it claimed a strategic location, used space
efﬁciently, and reiterated the steadfast dedication to foreign investment and
economic ‘emergence’ that the international community and voters had come to
expect.3 Through concrete overpasses and roundabouts – as well as through the
spectacular billboards, passionate speeches and public information campaigns
that accompanied them – Wade and his allies projected an alluring if implausible
vision of future possibility marked by wealth and abundance.
These infrastructural projects and promises also brought into sharper view the
urgency and inescapability of the present moment. As large-scale projects were
launched in quick succession around the city, trafﬁc bottlenecks and detours
multiplied, straining daily circulations, routines and livelihoods. For many in the
city, life came to gravitate around avoiding trafﬁc jams or locating alternative

1
As I write and revise this essay, dramatic change is under way in Senegal. Despite the existence
of a two-term limit that he himself had signed into law, Wade ran for a third presidential term in
early 2012. The election drew international attention, as thousands of voters took to Dakar’s
streets decrying Wade’s campaign. Wade lost in the second round of voting to his former protégé,
Macky Sall.
2
While Abidjan was long considered the unofﬁcial ‘capital’ of Francophone West Africa, a
series of political coups and uprisings have led to a regional reorientation, one that has in large
part favoured Dakar. This shift has solidiﬁed Wade’s mission to turn Dakar into a regional centre
for ﬁnance and banking, tourism, and technology.
3
To get a better sense of the way this commitment to economic ‘emergence’ is cast for both
international and local audiences, see, for instance, APIX S.A. 2011.
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routes. Furthermore, while resurfaced roads and new highways linked together
spaces of governance, global travel and elite consumption – in turn deﬁning a new
political, economic and social centre – the majority of urban residents were left to
contend with dilapidated roads unﬁt for passage, ruptured sewage pipes, frequent
power outages, and the seeming lack of state intervention and oversight in more
‘popular’ quarters of the city. As new highways and shopping plazas were
unveiled elsewhere in the city, Dakar’s neglected side roads and spaces came into
sharper view, splintering Wade’s sweeping vision for the nation’s future and
centring attention on the uncertainty of the immediate present. At the same time
that these pressing urban realities were decried and debated publicly, however,
they were also ripped from their historical moorings and depoliticized – not only
by state workers and elites, but also, at times, by those whose lives and futures
were made more precarious by the projects.
What distinguishes this particular moment in Dakar’s history from earlier
modes of urban transformation, I suggest, is what Jane Guyer has described as
an unsettling mix of ‘fantasy futurism and enforced presentism’ that guides
macroeconomic policy and other facets of life (2007: 409). Once seemingly
peculiar to the conditions of structural adjustment and military rule in Nigeria,
Guyer argues, this particular temporal sensibility is increasingly used to frame
and justify policy making around the world, in turn emptying the near past and
near future of moral, economic or political worth and meaning. Gone, she insists,
are past strategies ‘of planning and hoping, of tracing out mutual inﬂuences, of
engaging in struggles for speciﬁc goals, in short, of the process of implicating
oneself in the ongoing life of the social and material world that used to be
encompassed under an expansively inclusive concept of “reasoning” ’ (ibid.). In
their stead arise preoccupations with responding to the exigencies of immediate,
everyday life and offering long-term projections of growth and change.
In this essay, I draw on these theoretical insights to frame my discussion of
infrastructural vision and chronic uncertainty in contemporary Dakar. I situate
my analysis of temporality and infrastructural change within a growing body
of literature that focuses on roads as profoundly ambivalent material and
ideological structures (Dalakoglou 2010; Guldi 2012; Larkin 2008) that serve as
critical sites for the accumulation and contestation of meanings (Giles-Vernick
1996; Masquelier 2002; Roseman 1996). In recent years, a number of scholars
have paid keen ethnographic attention to the speculative and futuristic nature
of large-scale urban renewal projects in ways that echo Guyer’s observations
(De Boeck 2011; Khan 2006; Mains 2012). These important contributions have
been particularly attentive to the futuristic ﬁctions offered by these projects. They
give us a glimpse into the ways that discourses and practices of global capital
accumulation, economic partnership and neo-liberal governance shape everyday
life and urban landscapes in various post-colonial contexts. Less explicit attention
has been paid, however, to the ways infrastructural projects both evoke and
generate a very particular conception of life in the immediate, inescapable
present. I argue in this essay that Dakar’s infrastructural transformation made
spectacularly visible not only distant (and highly implausible) futures but also a
very particular vision of the present that rationalized, emphasized and even
celebrated the everyday hardships wrought by infrastructural change. Avowedly
ahistorical and centred squarely on the individual, these discourses of hardship
cast infrastructural change as a future-focused project brought about through
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‘temporary’ inconveniences and disruptions endured for the sake of the nation.
These conceptions of the present circulated through bureaucratic ofﬁces, were
afﬁrmed in promotional materials, and were both echoed and eschewed in public
spaces.
Moving through state ofﬁces, onto ailing side streets, and along emergent
roads, the analysis that follows draws on ethnographic data collected over the
course of twenty months during three separate research trips to Dakar.4 Each
section is anchored by an ethnographic encounter that brings into view the
complex relationship between infrastructural change, futuristic vision, and
immediate, destabilizing hardship in ‘structurally adjusted’ urban Senegal. What
emerges from this analysis is a more complex view of neo-liberal reform and
urban change in contemporary Africa.

HARDSHIP AS POLICY FRAMEWORK
May 2006. Tucked away on a quiet and shady street just steps from the presidential
residence, the stately headquarters of Senegal’s national investment promotion
agency, APIX,5 seems a world away from the urgencies and uncertainties of
everyday life in the city. Gathered inside a well-appointed and air-conditioned
meeting room of this quasi-state organization are a few APIX representatives and
half-a-dozen Nigerian military ofﬁcers of high rank, who have come to APIX to
learn more about privatization efforts in Senegal. Speaking in perfectly accented
English, Elhadji, a senior staff member at the agency, describes to his audience how
ordinary residents coped with the devaluation of the franc CFA in 1994, a reform
aimed at appeasing the World Bank and making Senegal attractive to foreign
interests: ‘Imagine – you wake up, and suddenly, the money in your pocket is worth
half what it was the day before. This was what the devaluation was. It meant that the
Senegalese people had to sacriﬁce, to endure difﬁcult times. Devaluation affected
everyone.’ As Elhadji makes his case to the Nigerian visitors, staff members working
down the hall are busy ﬁelding inquiries from national and international
media outlets about APIX’s critical role in the recently launched autoroute
4
Most of this research took place in 2006 and 2007, and was funded by the National Science
Foundation (SES-0549003), the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad
Program, and the Department of Anthropology at UC Irvine. Also critical to the arguments I
present here was a follow-up trip to Dakar that took place in January 2010, which was funded by
the Committee on Faculty Compensation and Development at Smith College. As a whole, this
research employed participant observation and semi-structured and unstructured interviews
carried out within three different spheres of urban life: in state and other governing ofﬁces,
located largely (but not exclusively) in the south of the city; in residential neighbourhoods
primarily in the north of the city; and on the highways and side streets that connected north and
south. Research was conducted in a mix of French and Wolof.
5
APIX (L’Agence Nationale Chargée de la Promotion de l’Investissement et des Grands
Travaux) is itself the product of an alliance between the World Bank and the Wade
administration. It is a quasi-state body that exists outside Senegal’s ministry system, and its
director general and her staff answer directly to the President. APIX is dedicated to facilitating
economic regulatory reforms, promoting private sector investment, and overseeing large-scale
national infrastructure projects, and it continues to do so in close conjunction with the World
Bank. APIX, in fact, remains a member of the World Bank Group’s Multinational Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
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construction project. It seems that, overnight, everyday circulations and livelihoods
have been brought to a violent halt, and urban residents are growing anxious and
impatient. Working to reorient the public’s attention to the grand futures that await
Senegal, staff members draw on discourses that are strikingly similar to those
employed by Elhadji – discourses of private capital ﬂow and alternative futures born
through individual hardship and daily sacriﬁce. In internal planning sessions and
meetings with ‘partners’, I note, APIX staff members cast the city’s worsening
trafﬁc jams, puzzling detours and lengthening commutes as des épreuves – ordeals,
hardships, tests of character – endured for the good of the nation.
By the spring of 2006, it seemed that all of Dakar’s attention was ﬁrmly ﬁxed on
the city’s roads. As urban residents worked to make sense of and navigate the
constantly shifting landscape around them, they discussed and debated the
promises and consequences of the road construction projects. But buried beneath
these urgent contemporary concerns were seemingly forgotten anxieties and
debates about restructuring efforts of another sort – namely, the 1994 devaluation
of the franc CFA, an economic measure that deeply affected more than a dozen
West and Central African countries. At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that the devaluation has little to do with the urban revitalization efforts under way in Senegal’s
capital more than a decade later – a conclusion that my APIX colleagues would
have endorsed. Indeed, urban residents and bureaucratic ofﬁcials did not connect
the two in any purposeful or explicit way in our interviews and conversations, and
I initially paid little attention to devaluation in my research notes. But in my daily
travels through state ofﬁces and along trafﬁc-clogged roads, this apparent
disconnect emerged as worthy of ethnographic scrutiny.
Instituted under the direction of the World Bank and other international
bodies, the franc CFA devaluation was an effort at economic liberalization aimed
at making African exports more competitive on the global market and at luring
foreign investors to the region. This technical ‘adjustment’ was carried out six
years before APIX became a formal institution, during the administration of
Abdoulaye Wade’s predecessor, Abdou Diouf. The impacts of devaluation were
experienced most acutely by the region’s poor, whose household budgets and
daily routines could not absorb the sudden and unpredictable rise in prices for
basic necessities that resulted (see, for instance, Bendech et al. 1997). Senegalese
with access to foreign currencies, through family members working in the
diaspora or business connections abroad, were better able to weather devaluation
than those without these connections. Moreover, while wealthier families could
manage to increase their household expenditures, the poor had to cut back on
cooking oil or rice, or do without meat or ﬁsh as inﬂation worsened. Devaluation
efforts thus served to widen the gap between the wealthy and the poor in a very
permanent way, offering new and lucrative opportunities to some residents while
dispossessing others.
Likewise, the large-scale road projects initiated in 2006 reﬂected bold efforts
by the state and its allies to make Senegal more modern, efﬁcient and ‘friendly’
to foreign investors. Described as a difﬁcult but crucial turning point in the
nation’s and the city’s history, these projects brought sudden and disorienting
change – road surfaces were uprooted, detours imposed without warning, incomes
threatened, routines and livelihoods transformed – all in the name of macroeconomic change. As with devaluation, these dramatic changes were experienced
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in deeply unequal ways. Perhaps the most striking evidence of this fact was the
forceful removal of people living on land designated for the future autoroute, a
signiﬁcant disruption of precarious lives on the city’s margins. But the projects
also highlighted more ordinary exclusions and inequalities. Not all of Dakar’s
neighbourhood roads proﬁted from urban revitalization efforts; instead, elite
coastal neighbourhoods receiving the lion’s share of attention and resources to the
exclusion of the city’s popular quarters, where even sewerage and water
infrastructures were not dependable. Moreover, while all urban commuters had
to deal with trafﬁc bottlenecks and barricaded roads, the city’s poorer residents
typically did so in road-weary, overcrowded vehicles that were poorly ventilated
and had unconvincing safety records. Because buses moved along ﬁxed routes,
drivers could not invent new paths to dodge trafﬁc jams as drivers with their own
automobiles could. From this perspective, the city’s elite not only stood to gain
the most from the projects, which focused on developing sites of cosmopolitan
living, consumption and governance; they also could better contain and manage
the negative impacts of the road construction efforts on their routines, incomes
and physical well-being.
Neither of these projects was implemented without controversy or public
debate. As inﬂation worsened in the months following devaluation, an outraged
Senegalese public took to the streets in (sometimes violent) protest, and the
national media accused Senegal’s leaders of betrayal (Creevey et al. 1995). And
yet, these grievances seemed slowly to fade from the public agenda. Devaluation,
it seemed, had gradually become a banal, apolitical feature of the economic
landscape of contemporary Africa, and the public turned its attention to newer
liberalization initiatives.6 By the time I arrived in Dakar in 2006, few urban
residents were talking about the currency devaluation outside of bureaucratic
ofﬁces. Within these spaces of economic governance, devaluation and its
profound everyday effects were retrospectively rationalized and legitimized
through a discourse, implicit or otherwise, of individual ‘hardship’, as Elhadji’s
presentation to his Nigerian guests makes clear. This perspective conceptualized
disruptions that followed currency devaluation as temporary, and it celebrated
individual burdens as sacriﬁces endured for the beneﬁt of one’s city, nation or
region. Through these sanitized accounts, which circulated in various guises
through other ofﬁces of economic governance in the city, devaluation became a
sturdy and objective feature of the economic infrastructure, an apolitical technical
adjustment, one that helped put the national economy on the path towards
liberalization and development, even if it brought immediate turmoil as ordinary
people struggled to make do. And the deep and quite visible inequalities that
resulted from these ostensibly ‘necessary’ economic readjustments, it seemed,
were hardened into bland realities.
What I witnessed in 2006 and 2007, I suggest, was a resuscitation of this
particular explanatory logic. As worsening trafﬁc jams and detours sparked
public outrage and accusations of government deception and abandonment,
ofﬁcials called on urban residents to be patient and to focus on the brilliant
futures that awaited the city and the nation. Towering billboards celebrating

6
For an excellent foundational discussion of the depoliticization of development, see Ferguson
1994.
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Senegal’s dazzling future were strategically placed where trafﬁc tended to thicken,
and public service campaigns detailing project goals were sandwiched between
popular evening television programmes. These nightly announcements typically
began with spectacular, computer-generated images of a futuristic Dakar, but
they quickly shifted attention toward identifying detours and problem zones and
rationalizing the impossible present as enabling an alternative future. APIX
ofﬁcials and their collaborators thus acknowledged the disruptions posed by the
projects, but they ﬁrmly insisted that these circumstances were transitory and
would enable long-term growth and prosperity. Indeed, when I returned to the
city in 2010, several of the ofﬁcials with whom I spoke pronounced the urban
component of the infrastructural projects complete and insisted that the
disruptions they caused had come to an end as well. These hardships were further
cast as evidence of the indispensability of the projects; urban reconstruction
efforts would, with time, ease the daily movements and economic plight of the
poor, ofﬁcials insisted, even if they seemed temporarily to exacerbate their
predicaments. These urban projects would also spark similar schemes in other
sections of the city – roads would beget roads, creating a system of transit that
would better integrate the entire city. Moreover, staff members frequently
emphasized the hardships that they themselves faced as they navigated the city
each day, complaining of time spent in trafﬁc, ﬂat tyres, missed appointments and
angry motorists. In doing so, they effectively cast themselves as diligent, burdenbearing citizens who were personally invested in the charting of new futures.
These everyday conversations also produced the process of infrastructural change
as an equalizing, even democratizing, force that shaped quite different lives in
remarkably similar ways.
Taken together, these ethnographic observations draw attention to an important
paradox of neo-liberal reform in Senegal and elsewhere: at the same time that state
ofﬁcials emphasized and even celebrated individual responsibilities and hardships
as the engine of economic change, they ﬂattened and denied the multiplicity and
complexities of these experiences, thus obscuring the inequalities that the projects
were both built upon and produced (see Hill 2001). Moreover, these hardships were
conceptualized as episodic, as ﬂeeting disruptions that were wholly unrelated to
past restructurings and exclusions. Although the ‘enforced presentism’ I describe
here did not make for the sorts of appealing promotional brochures that futuristic
highways and grand monuments did, short-term hardships were nonetheless
integral facets of infrastructural change and macroeconomic policy in Dakar. How
did urban residents encounter and conceptualize these temporal asymmetries in
infrastructural ideology? How did they make sense of hardship as both an
individual experience and a state-sanctioned value? And how did they experience
the shifts in urban space that these presentist logics precipitated? Drawing on
ethnographic encounters that unfolded on three quite different city streets, the ﬁnal
three sections explore urban reactions and interpretations of infrastructural
transformation in the months and years following the initiation of the projects.

PROTESTING PRESENTISM
January 2010. Located just a few kilometres north-west of APIX, Marché Sandaga
is Dakar’s most expansive urban marketplace. It is afternoon, near lunchtime, and
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my cab driver, Laye, inches slowly through the bustling intersection at Avenue
Peytavin and Avenue Lamine Gueye at the cusp of the famed market. This
intersection is the gateway to the country’s informal economy, a place where urban
residents of various backgrounds barter for textiles, vegetables, or bootlegged
DVDs. Imported Chinese products are arranged on the streets and sidewalks
alongside carefully sorted heaps of secondhand goods. Cars, buses, shoppers and
vendors weave around and through the densely packed intersection with myriad
goals and destinations in mind. There is no obvious formal regulation that guides
trafﬁc at this junction: no noticeable signs, no authorities directing trafﬁc, no clear
pattern dictating right-of-way. Instead, drivers and pedestrians alike must negotiate
their passage individually, either with extreme caution or with reckless deﬁance.
As we proceed, Laye’s mind is ﬁxed ﬁrmly on the latest of Wade’s controversial
building projects, Le Monument de la Renaissance Africaine. It is a project whose
goals and meanings he claims are dubious. As we approach the intersection, Laye’s
tirade comes to an abrupt halt as a moped veers into our path without warning. He
slams on his brakes to avoid hitting the driver or the pedestrians that had followed in
the moped’s wake. ‘This is the problem with this country!’ Laye screams, gesturing
wildly at the frenzied scene before us. ‘You see, this intersection is like this country.’
He explains that while Wade focuses his attention on developing orderly, modern
routes for investors and diplomats, the rest of the country is left without guidance,
without direction, without laws. People are only looking out for themselves, he says,
and they make decisions without any regard for what is in front of them; there is no
certainty about what comes next. We drive in stunned silence for a few moments,
until Laye adds, almost philosophically, that the patterns of trafﬁc at this
intersection resemble the way that Wade’s government itself functions: the police,
the President, the ministers and other public ofﬁcials look out for their own interests.
There is no order, no regulation. Money changes hands, moves quickly, disappears.
Laye adds angrily that Wade is ‘mad’. He squanders national resources on
monuments and highways instead of making realistic plans to deal with urban
overcrowding or profoundly uneven access to quality medical care.
This lively intersection in the heart of the city offers an ideal vantage point
from which to launch a discussion of the ways urban residents made sense of
dramatic infrastructural change in contemporary Dakar. During colonialism, this
section of the city was known as Dakar-ville or simply la ville, and was home to
the city’s European population and to évolué (evolved) Africans given the status
of French citizens. As an experiment in assimilationist rule, Dakar-ville was
strictly segregated from the so-called ‘African’ quarters, called Médina, on the
city’s periphery, which supplied labour to the European district. In contrast to
the unpaved roads and ostensibly impermanent housing of Médina (see Ndione
and Soumaré 1982; Betts 1971), Dakar-ville was distinguished by its grand
boulevards, cafés, government buildings, tidy shops and multi-storey residences
(Whittlesey 1948). After independence, Dakar-ville was renamed Plateau, and, as
the heart of the now post-colonial capital city, it was rapidly transformed by the
construction of new government ministry buildings, monuments and museums,
all of which were intended to make materially present President Léopold Sédar
Senghor’s visions of négritude and post-colonial nationalism. Plateau also
contained some of the city’s liveliest commercial spaces, including Marché
Sandaga, a thriving market originally known for its textiles and produce that
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grew quickly both in terms of the area it encompassed and the products it offered
(Ebin 1992). In the decades following independence, Plateau became home to
international and non-governmental organizations as well as to APIX, and it was
widely regarded as the city’s economic, cultural and political heart.
Yet despite the quarter’s continued relevance to daily life, many of Plateau’s
thriving spaces did not play a particularly prominent role in Wade’s vision for the
city’s and the nation’s future. Absent from Wade’s soaring oratory about
economic emergence, for instance, were the thriving street markets and shops
whose religious trade networks span continents and whose wares draw scores of
urban residents each day.7 These spaces, too, received little direct ﬁnancial
investment from the government. For Laye, Wade’s vision was one that focused
on certain streets and populations and that left the majority of the city’s
residents – who frequented markets like Sandaga instead of the up-scale shopping
and dining venues of the Corniche – to fend for themselves. What this cab driver
noted from his vantage point within this crowded and unmonitored intersection
was a startling sort of withdrawal of the state from the very space in which it has
for so long been rooted. Indeed, on the majority of the city’s roads, his reﬂection
suggests, the state seems nowhere to be found, its attention ﬁxed instead on grand
projects in other sections of the city. Motorists and pedestrians must instead move
alone through these spaces, navigating vehicles and bodies through dangerous
intersections and toward unpredictable futures (see also Simone 2004; Khan
2006). From Laye’s perspective, Dakar’s roads did not profess a vision of national
futures achieved through personal hardship; rather, they revealed a fragmented
sense of the present, one in which everyone was driven by individual goals and
desperate circumstances. Within these spaces neglected by the state, Laye
suggested, people became focused on ﬁnding ways to get by on their own, using
tactics that were often extra-legal, opaque or detrimental to the well-being of the
community. Urban life became a matter of responding to immediate urgencies
and unexpected shifts in trafﬁc, policy or prices.
Laye’s impassioned critique thus implicitly rejected sanitized notions of
hardship endured for the good of the nation. Instead, the cab driver pointed
out the state’s complicity in the production of inequalities, insisting that the
refocusing of state commitments came at a grave cost for many in the city, who
were forced to endure the consequences of restructuring projects in everyday
ways, alone, without safety nets once provided by the Senegalese government. As
we drove, for instance, Laye described to me his own efforts to fulﬁl obligations to
his aging parents while caring for his own family who still resided in the
countryside. He complained, too, about his own ailing health, made worse by the
long hours he worked and the poor conditions of the road. The profound physical
consequences of infrastructural projects were a very common topic of discussion
during my time in the city. Cab drivers and other commuters complained bitterly
about the toll that exhaust fumes and trafﬁc jams had exacted on their health and
well-being, and they frequently offered estimates of income or time lost to
bottlenecks or detours. In this sense, the inequalities Laye and other urban
residents noted were inherently corporeal, inscribed upon and suffered by bodies,
both in the city and in Senegal’s vast rural hinterland. These quiet protests make

7

For more on transnational Murid trade diasporas, see Diouf 2000.
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clear that, in an age of monumental urban construction projects, caring and
providing for selves and communities become burdens borne quietly by
individuals, families and households rather than the responsibilities of the
paternalistic state. Moreover, Laye’s assessment pushes against ofﬁcial efforts to
decontextualize and depoliticize experiences of present hardships. Instead, this
urban motorist puts his own travails into a context of ongoing hardship and
more widespread state neglect. In doing so, Laye also questions the purportedly
temporary nature of infrastructural upheaval. These ‘temporary’ shifts indeed
have deep histories and long-term effects.
My encounter with Laye offers one ﬁnal observation about the nature of
popular resistance in an age of visionary public works projects. In many ways,
Laye’s incisive critique of Wade’s projects reﬂects a rich history of political
engagement with and on Dakar’s streets. Just as generations of disillusioned
urban residents before him had done, Laye protested the state’s apparent absence
from the everyday affairs of its citizens, using the social and material space of
the street itself as stage and substance for his claims.8 Yet, in stark contrast to
previous street-centred dramas, the particular form of protest I describe here
tended to take place in more contained spaces – inside cabs, buses, homes, or on
call-in radio programmes – and often as people were en route elsewhere. Despite
palpable public outrage, the road projects did not seem to inspire the kinds of
organized, collective protests that other acts of state neglect – like university
budget cuts or unpaid public sector salaries – had managed to ignite. Instead,
I found, urban residents frequently voiced their opposition during the course of
their everyday routines and conversations, and did so in highly individualized
ways. How do we make sense of the conspicuous absence of purposeful, collective
protest against the projects? And what does this have to tell us about
infrastructural articulations of the present? Turning attention to one of Dakar’s
emergent routes, the next section considers one urban resident’s startling
acceptance of the large-scale changes under way.
THE CONCRETE PRESENT
January 2010. ‘This is where the city is now,’ Baba states matter-of-factly, as he
winds the sputtering taxicab along the Route de la Corniche. We are headed north
8
Over the past half-century, ardent nationalists, university students, union workers, political
party adherents, street vendors and others have taken to Dakar’s streets to protest funding
cutbacks, living or working conditions, new government restrictions, or controversial elections.
Moreover, it was on the city’s streets – particularly those of Dakar’s popular neighbourhoods –
that Abdoulaye Wade initially rallied disenchanted youth in the 1990s behind his calls for change
(sopi) and party turnover (alternance), and achieved public visibility as a future-minded leader.
Perhaps most notable among Dakar’s street-centred dramas was the set-setal movement of the
late 1980s and early 1990s, in which disaffected youth confronted the state and the ruling class,
declared public spaces their own, and struggled to install new visions of morality and political
accountability (Diouf 1996). Through violent attacks on ‘outsiders’, and more positively through
mural painting and urban clean-up operations, Dakar’s youth publicly called into question the
discourses and practices of post-colonial nationalism. The roads themselves – neglected,
crumbling, insalubrious – were indexed as evidence of the state’s broken promises and became
crucial platforms and canvases on which youth expressed their demands and alternative visions of
nation.
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from Plateau towards the neighbourhood of Les Almadies, famed for its towering
villas and up-scale nightlife. ‘Dakar is no longer Plateau. And it’s certainly not the
suburbs [les banlieues]. It’s the Corniche.’ Two and a half years have passed since
Baba and I ﬁrst met, and he is eager to show me the dramatic transformations the
city has undergone since our last encounter. I marvel at the ease of our journey and
at the luxury hotels, discreetly sited, which have emerged along the coast since my
last trip. The road is smooth, the view of the glittering Atlantic astounding. A native
of the suburb of Pikine, where he still lives with his parents and siblings, Baba
positions himself as an urban expert and as an outspoken critic of Wade. As we
drive, I’m reminded of a conversation we had had years before, when large sections
of the Corniche were barricaded as the seaside route was spectacularly reinvented.
Baba had blasted Wade and dismissed his infrastructural ambitions as impotent,
describing how, instead, he would have gone about revitalizing the city through the
construction of youth centres that would offer training workshops. So, as we drive and
chat, I am struck by what seems now like his quiet acceptance of the changes brought
about by the Corniche project. Years before, Baba seemed to me a revolutionary,
the roads his battleground. Today, he is more subdued. ‘Corniche—the new Dakar,’
I jot quickly in my notes, not yet quite sure what to make of this tiny revelation.
Baba’s reluctant but powerful statement – that the heart of Dakar had shifted to
the elite coastal highway – complements Laye’s accusations of state neglect and
reorients our discussion toward the grand new spaces afforded through global
partnerships. But it also offers additional insight into how infrastructures were
used to make certain kinds of claims on the present. Making sense of these
complex assertions ﬁrst requires a more thorough discussion both of Abdoulaye
Wade’s ‘vision’ and of this particular coastal neighbourhood. The election of
Wade in 2000 is typically assumed to be a watershed moment in Senegal’s political
history, as it was the ﬁrst time a member of the opposition party had successfully
claimed the ofﬁce of President. Unlike his predecessor Abdou Diouf – who was
often rebuked for his ‘technocratic’ approach, protectionist policies, and focus on
management at the expense of future-oriented planning (see Diouf 1997) – Wade
positioned himself as a charismatic leader committed to populist issues and openmarket economics. His rallying call of sopi found notable support among urban
youth, who had felt increasingly marginalized by the structural adjustment
policies implemented during Diouf’s administration. After his election, Wade
focused on creating economic opportunities through a commitment to liberal
economic reform and private sector investment, particularly in infrastructure
(Galvan 2001). Over the next several years – in ways that seemed in some ways to
belie his commitment to ‘decentralization’ – Wade centred much of his attention
on reimagining the ‘emergent’ nation from and through the capital city: Dakar’s
hopeful new airport, improved and expanded highways, and modernized spaces of
consumption would better connect Senegal globally, he insisted, and would in turn
spark the infusion of capital into rural areas as well.
In many ways, the revitalized Route de la Corniche Ouest – long central to
the imaginary of Dakar – stood as an emblem of Wade’s grand vision for the
city and the nation. What began during colonialism as a ‘macadam (and
dusty) . . . road’ (Whittlesey 1948: 627) that connected the city’s northern airﬁelds
with the colonial settlement in the south gradually became a ‘romantic’ route
that boasted bougainvillea-shaded villas and exceptional views of the majestic
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Atlantic Ocean (Bigon 2009; Roberts and Roberts 2007). For decades, the
neighbourhoods surrounding the Corniche had hosted dignitaries, embassy
ofﬁces, NGO and IO ofﬁces, well-heeled expatriates and the country’s prestigious
Université Cheikh Anta Diop. But in 2006, the Corniche achieved new visibility
and status. The Organisation de la Conférence Islamique (OCI), a global
collectivity of 56 Islamic/Muslim majority states, launched an ambitious effort to
refashion the aging coastal route into a showcase boulevard beﬁtting the
organization’s Eleventh Islamic Summit, held in Dakar in March 2008. Wade
appointed his son, Karim, to preside over Senegal’s newly founded Agence
Nationale de l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique (ANOCI) and the
construction projects more speciﬁcally. This move sparked a great deal of
controversy in the media and among urban residents, who saw Wade’s selection
of his son as an effort to shape him as his successor. But it also revealed Wade’s
desire to claim as his own a project launched and ﬁnanced by foreign interests and
organizations. More speciﬁcally, the Corniche project reﬂected a strengthening of
ties with Islamic countries and organizations; the increasing importance of
‘South–South’ alliances and capital ﬂows; the continued role of international
organizations and governments in shaping African futures; and the saliency of
discourses of ‘partnership’ aimed at neo-liberal investment.
By the time of my return in 2010, the sleek new road was ﬁrmly established as
a fashionable destination for travel, up-scale living, and consumption. No longer
did tourists need to head to Plateau to locate cosmopolitan restaurants and
hotels, as once was the case. Even the World Bank had abandoned its downtown
headquarters for a brand-new home along the Corniche, joining various
embassies and private companies already located here. These moves, along with
the Wade administration’s commitment to narrating Dakar’s future through the
construction of these emergent ‘global’ spaces, produced this road as a site of
intensive moral and economic investment, as a space where the city, the nation,
and the administration could be reborn and restaged through neo-liberal logics of
global capital ﬂow. While the presidential palace and most ofﬁcial state ofﬁces
remained ﬁrmly situated in the city’s centre, just as they had been during Povey’s
visit, narrations of the nation’s present and future were no longer dispatched
exclusively from these spaces and institutions. In this sense, Baba’s assertion that
‘This is where the city is now’ was an acknowledgment of the spatial shifts and
realignments that had transpired in the capital since the road projects began.
But we might also read Baba’s statement as an effort to come to terms with the
concrete realities of the lived present. In his work on Nigerian infrastructures,
Brian Larkin (2008) notes the tension between grand futuristic visions and the
immediate present, demonstrating how seemingly authoritative visions became
mundane as spectacular highways and roads became routine spaces of everyday
circulation and breakdown. The vision imposed by these infrastructures was
constantly reinterpreted and contested in unforeseeable ways by the city residents
who travelled them, laboured to build them, or otherwise came into contact
with them.9 Indeed, urban residents used the Corniche and other emergent
surfaces and structures as a means to understand their place in the city’s
emergent cosmology and to assemble and circulate powerful counter-readings

9

See, for instance, Sembène 1960.
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of the state’s efforts. For instance, several residents gestured to the materiality of
the new roads and their management as proof that Wade’s plans for the future did
not include them, as Baba had during numerous conversations in 2006 and 2007.
Another taxi driver pointed out slight cracks in the brand new concrete as
evidence that Wade and his cronies were guilty of brokering illicit deals with
foreign ﬁrms and pocketing cash that could be used for real urban renewal efforts.
Several critics pointed out the illogicality of the road’s design, while others
criticized the administration’s failure to adequately plan detours: for many, this
was a sign of the state’s disorderly approach to development and lack of foresight.
Wade and his projects were not without supporters, however. Some cab
drivers, for instance, would marvel aloud at vivid billboards celebrating project
goals, at the legion of polished-looking youth the project employed to direct
trafﬁc, and at the dusty roads that were supposedly a tabula rasa on which
Wade’s administration could write the city’s future. One driver’s future-oriented
optimism is particularly illustrative here: ‘After these roads are built,’ he
exclaimed, ‘Dakar will be a grand city – like Paris! Like New York!’ And yet,
I found that declarations like these were nearly always accompanied by an
acknowledgment of their fears that these large-scale projects, slated to continue
for several years, would eat at their meagre incomes and damage the prospects of
those who depended upon their salaries, at least in the short term. At the same
time that these urbanites found the futures proposed by Wade’s schemes alluring,
they also reluctantly acknowledged the very personal and immediate toll that
these infrastructural transformations had taken on their lives and routines.
Given this culture of open criticism, my reunion with Baba in 2010 left me
perplexed and unsettled. During our previous encounters, I had viewed him as a
dedicated revolutionary who regarded criticism and public debate as a way of
being and as a tool for social change. How was I to make sense of Baba’s quiet
acquiescence to the changes wrought by the new roads, of his seeming acceptance
of his own peripheral positionality, just a few years after he had blasted the
projects and spoken of concrete alternatives? I suggest here that, as roads
become mundane spaces of transit, they not only open up spaces for contesting
authoritative design and ideology, as Larkin makes clear, but they also can
become taken-for-granted physical structures that depoliticize and depersonalize
everyday experiences of exclusion and hardship. From this perspective, the oncecharged spaces of the Route de la Corniche had become unremarkable features of
the urban landscape. During my absence from the city, Baba had certainly
travelled along the Corniche hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of times, slowly
coming to accept the physical road as well as the social, economic, and political
realities that this new structure cemented. Baba had not been won over by grand
futuristic visions, I argue, as much as he had resigned himself to the realities of the
present. Relocating to the city’s margins, the next section offers a ﬁnal perspective
on how urban residents come to terms with the gap between presentist logics and
futuristic promises in contemporary Dakar.

NAVIGATING AN UNRULY PRESENT
January 2010. After hailing a cab in Plateau, I am headed toward Parcelles
Assainies, a densely populated residential section in the northern part of the city that
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I had called home in 2006. I am returning to visit the generous hosts I now call
family as well as other neighbourhood friends. The cab moves with surprising ease
along smoothly paved roads, up the connector segment of the autoroute, a road I
had always associated with trafﬁc bottlenecks and dense exhaust fumes. As soon as
we exit the autoroute and then enter Parcelles, however, the road surfaces change
dramatically. I realize quickly that little has in fact changed here since 2006 and
2007. Infrastructures are often overwhelmed and woefully under-ﬁnanced. In some
sections of Parcelles, motorists habitually avoid the designated road surfaces, driving instead along the unpaved shoulders of the road because they’re less treacherous.
As we approach the home in which I once lived, built with funds from the
diaspora, we pass the shuttered Sandwich’rie shop, and I’m immediately reminded
of the profound ambivalence that has characterized Wade’s ‘vision’ from the start.
The small snack shop was once owned and operated by Laurent, the son of a
Togolese mother and a Senegalese father. He had been born and raised in Dakar but
had spent the past several years working and studying in Europe and the United
States. He returned from Paris in late 2005 because, he said, Wade had given him
hope. It wasn’t so much Wade’s political party or platform, Laurent explained, but
instead his concrete commitment to change. He had read while abroad of Wade’s
plans for the city – of his desire to build new roads, in particular – and he returned
with his wife, ﬁlled with optimism, determined to open a business and eager to start a
family in his natal Dakar.
But by late 2006, Laurent’s optimism had deﬂated. He pointed to the insalubrious
street as evidence of despair as we spoke one summer afternoon, worried that the
sewage that constantly overﬂowed just outside the restaurant was discouraging
customers. Drivers had to navigate carefully around the mess that it made.
Pedestrians increasingly avoided the segment of road altogether if they could.
Laurent no longer indexed Wade’s roads as a source of hope but saw them instead as
a sign of the President’s questionable priorities and empty promises of long-term
‘change’. By early 2007, around the time of Wade’s re-election, Laurent abruptly
abandoned his enterprise and returned to France to work at a ski resort. Nearly
three years later, the Sandwich’rie sign remains afﬁxed to an empty storefront, and I
hear from my Parcelles ‘family’ that the sewage problems persist as well.
This ethnographic encounter juxtaposes brief glimpses of two dramatically
different spaces and temporal conﬁgurations: the city’s sleek and futuristic new
autoroute, which was a site of intensive ﬁnancial and ideological investment
during Wade’s administration; and the burgeoning neighbourhood of Parcelles
Assainies, located on the cusp of Dakar’s banlieues. It was the construction of the
autoroute that my colleagues at APIX were working so hard to manage and
promote. Touted as one of the ﬁrst of its kind on the continent, the ambitious
project aimed at improving circulation between Dakar’s northern and southern
extremities and providing a direct link between the peninsular city and the
Senegalese mainland. Estimated to cost 500 million dollars (200 billion FCFA),
the autoroute was ﬁnanced through a ‘public–private partnership’ between the
World Bank, which provided a loan to the Senegalese government; the African
Development Bank; the French Agency for Development; the International
Development Association (IDA); and an ‘unidentiﬁed’ foreign group (World
Bank n.d.). The new road was intended to ease congestion within the densely
populated peninsular city, to better integrate the country’s rural and urban
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regions, and, by extension, to attract potential investors to the capital city with its
promises of efﬁciency and modernity.
Parcelles Assainies (‘Improved Plots of Land’), too, was born from an alliance
between the Senegalese state and the World Bank, though one whose sheen had
long since faded. The neighbourhood formally emerged in the early 1970s as an
experiment in providing affordable land ownership opportunities to some of the
city’s lower-income residents (Bop 1983). This effort was premised on the
assumption that land ownership among the urban masses was a necessary
prerequisite for the construction of a strong democracy and a liberalized
economy. The project also focused on improving or extending road structures,
electricity networks and drainage systems. Over the next few decades, Parcelles
grew steadily, as lots were divided and sold for proﬁt, as migrants to the city
sought affordable housing, as autoconstruction practices became popular, and
later as diasporic Senegalese built homes for family or for proﬁt (Melly 2010;
Tall 2009). By the time I arrived in Dakar in 2006, Parcelles was a thriving, if
geographically and economically marginalized quartier. It was home to a rapidly
expanding population of youth and to an increasingly diverse cadre of new
arrivals from all over West Africa. It boasted lively markets and was a key site of
political mobilization and economic growth, as Laurent’s story suggests. But the
Parcelles of 2010 also seemed strikingly lacking in organized governmental
intervention, and life for many in the quarter was precarious and uncertain at
best. Once a site of deep moral investment by the state, once a darling of
international organizations, Parcelles Assainies was now kept aﬂoat by an
expanding informal economy and by remittances sent from abroad (Simone 2004;
Tall 2009).
This ﬁnal ethnographic encounter with an itinerant urbanite, an underfunded
infrastructural system, and a pulsing popular district on the city’s frontiers
reiterates many of the points already made in this essay: that contemporary
infrastructural projects are as much about rationalizing present impossibilities as
they are about asserting spectacular expectations for the future; that weary bodies
and vehicles must bear the brunt of the uneven allocation of resources; that road
projects involve practices of collective forgetting as often as they conjure histories
and memories; that individuals’ interpretations of the present and the future shift
as they come into physical contact with concrete infrastructures. Like the other
urban residents whose perspectives I have shared, Laurent’s itinerary was
profoundly shaped by the roads themselves – by their promises and their failures,
by the possibilities they opened up and by those they foreclosed. His story further
serves as an illuminating example of how, in some ways, the Wade administration’s road-centred visions inspired global connections and a ﬂow of foreign
capital after all – though perhaps not always in the way the administration had
anticipated they would – and of how the state and its allies proﬁted in indirect but
important ways from the spectacular hardships quietly endured by individuals
and their families. Like Laurent, many urban residents strategized to escape the
impossibilities of the present and conjured alternative visions of the future –
forging new personal networks, inserting themselves into informal economies and
sometimes-shadowy networks, or endeavouring to migrate abroad (see Simone
2005). But while Laurent was able to trade his predicament in the city for the
(quite different) hardships of displacement, Laye, Baba and others remained
thoroughly emplaced, forced to contend with the urgencies of the present.
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When juxtaposed, the four encounters I have described in this essay bring into
view what happens when the ‘temporary’ disruptions and exclusions wrought by
infrastructural change become enduring experiences of hardship: just as new and
controversial roads become taken-for-granted features of the urban landscape
with time, so too do the inequalities and exclusions they reinforce. Dakar’s largescale road projects were just as much about rationalizing present hardship, I
argue, as they were about professing spectacular expectations for an impossibly
distant future. The architects of this historical moment saw roads as apolitical
facts, disruptions as temporary, and near-future planning as unnecessary – once
built, the roads themselves would effect long-term change. Nonetheless, these
ethnographic encounters make clear the limits of these rationalizing agendas,
highlighting instead the unruliness of the present moment and the incompatibility
of Dakarois’ experiences and narratives of urban change and state commitment.
These observations thus underscore the need for ethnographic research that is
attentive to the presentist logics that accompany futuristic visions of infrastructural change. This kind of work might, in turn, illuminate the broader temporal
shifts and displacements that result as the once ‘exotic’ rhetorics of neo-liberal
restructuring (Guyer 2007) are cemented as standard elements of the global
economic landscape.
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ABSTRACT

During his term as President, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal sought to make
tangible and proximal his ‘vision’ for the country’s future through the
construction and rehabilitation of vital arteries in the capital, Dakar. Drawing
on extensive ethnographic research, this essay takes as its focus these ambitious
road projects and their local interpretations and everyday effects. I argue that
Dakar’s infrastructural transformation made spectacularly visible not only
distant and implausible futures but also a very particular vision of the present
that rationalized, emphasized, and even celebrated the everyday hardships
wrought by infrastructural change. Avowedly ahistorical and centred squarely
on the individual, these discourses of hardship cast infrastructural change as a
future-focused project brought about through ‘temporary’ inconveniences and
disruptions endured for the sake of the nation. What emerges from this analysis is
a more complex view of neo-liberal reform and urban change in contemporary
Africa.
RÉSUMÉ

Durant sa présidence, le Sénégalais Abdoulaye Wade a cherché à rendre tangible
et proximale sa « vision » du futur du pays en construisant et en réaménageant de
grandes artères dans la capitale, Dakar. S’inspirant de nombreuses recherches
ethnographiques, cet essai porte sur ces projets routiers ambitieux, leurs
interprétations locales et leur impact au quotidien. L’auteur soutient que la
transformation infrastructurelle de Dakar a rendu spectaculairement visibles non
seulement des futurs éloignés et invraisemblables, mais aussi une vision très
particulière du présent qui a rationnalisé, souligné et même célébré les difﬁcultés
du quotidien provoquées par le changement infrastructurel. Manifestement
anhistoriques et carrément centrés sur l’individu, ces discours de la difﬁculté
présentent le changement infrastructurel comme un projet orienté vers le futur
engendré au travers d’inconvénients et de perturbations « temporaires » endurés
pour le bien de la nation. Il ressort de cette analyse une vue plus complexe de la
réforme néolibérale et du changement urbain en Afrique contemporaine.
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